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I. INTRODUCTION 
The debate regarding international harmonization of a grace 
period in international patent law is not new.1  The recent change 
from first-to-invent to first-to-file2 in the United States under the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)3 offers a renewed 
opportunity to call for the adoption of a novelty grace period as an 
international best practice—specifically in Europe. 
A novelty grace period allows an invention to become publicly 
known prior to the invention’s application filing date, where that 
disclosure otherwise would bar the invention’s patentability.4  
 
 1.  See Joseph Straus, Grace Period and the European and International Patent 
Law: Analysis of Key Legal and Socio-Economic Aspects, in 20 STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW (Gerhard Schricker ed., 2001) (describing the 
debate of a European grace period as far back as 1968); Margo A. Bagley, The Need 
for Speed (and Grace): Issues in a First-Inventor-to-File World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1035 (2008); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the 
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 543 
(1988). 
 2.  First-to-file is referred to as first-inventor-to-file in the America Invents 
Act and in common usage in the United States.  For simplicity, this note will refer 
to first-to-file when referring both to first-inventor-to-file in the United States and 
first-to-file in the rest of the world. 
 3.  The first-to-file provision took effect March 16, 2013.  See Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 293 (2011). 
 4.  2 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 8:199 (4th ed. 2012).  A 
more in depth description is provided by Emmanuel Roucounas: 
The term . . . grace period . . . is understood as a period of time (six or 
twelve months) preceding the filing of a patent application, during which 
disclosures by any means (in writing, orally, by use, on exhibitions, etc.) 
of the invention for which the patent application is filed by the inventor 
or his/her successor in title do not constitute prior art in respect of the 
patent application at hand.  In principle, such ‘non-prejudicial’ 
2
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United States patent law operates with a one-year grace period,5 
whereas the patent offices under the European Patent Convention 
require absolute novelty.6  In patent systems with absolute novelty, 
any disclosure making the invention publicly known prior to filing 
a patent application will preclude the inventor from obtaining a 
patent on that invention.7 
Introducing a grace period under the European Patent 
Convention as a limited safety net against disclosures by 
unsophisticated applicants will protect the ability of applicants to 
meet university research publication requirements or evaluate the 
commercial potential of an invention before committing resources 
to patenting.8 
The grace-period concept is a controversial feature of the 
patent system to some because it abrogates the fundamental notion 
that a powerful monopoly should only be granted to inventions not 
previously disclosed to the public.9  That is, “[i]nventors are never 
entitled to take from the public subject matter that deemed [sic] 
already known or merely obvious from what is deemed to be 
known.”10  Absolute novelty is practical to administer by patent 
 
disclosures do not establish a priority date, i.e. do not provide for 
immunity for the inventor/applicant against parallel or later independent 
disclosures, including patent applications of third parties.  Immunity is 
granted to the inventor himself against inconsiderate or rash publication.  In 
spite of previous disclosure of the invention by the applicant or his/her 
predecessor in title, novelty is not destroyed.  An invention is novel when 
it does not form part of the state of the art. 
Emmanuel Roucounas, The Debate Regarding the Grace Period in International Patent 
Law: A Reminder, in ALLEA BIENNIAL Y.B. 2006 31, 31 (Jüri Engelbrecht & Johannes 
J.F. Schroots eds. 2007) (footnote omitted). 
 5.  Roucounas, supra note 4, at 31–33. 
 6.  See, e.g., id. at 37. 
 7.  Straus, supra note 1, at v.  Article 55 of the European Patent Convention 
does allow for two types of nonprejudicial disclosures that will not destroy an 
invention’s novelty—evident abuse and exhibition at an internationally recognized 
exhibition.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 8.  See infra Parts V.A–B. 
 9.  See ROBERT A. ARMITAGE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR “PRIOR ART” 
DISTINCTIONS AMONG PATENT SYSTEMS: INSIGHTS INTO A                                                 
BALANCED, HARMONIZED PATENT SYSTEM 1 (2003), available                                                 
at http://www2.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings_and_Events1 
/International_Symposia1/ArmitagePaper.pdf; JAN E.M. GALAMA, EXPERT               
OPINION ON THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF A GRACE                        
PERIOD IN EUROPEAN PATENT LAW 13 (2000), available                                                              
at http://web.archive.org/web/20000817072657/http://www.epo.co.at/news 
/headlns/pdf/galama.pdf. 
 10.  ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 1. 
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offices because the filing date of the application may not be 
preceded by any disclosure of the invention’s subject matter.11  
Absolute novelty, however, is a rigid concept apart from the reality 
of modern research, capital, and inventors’ knowledge of the 
patent system.12 
The major patent offices in the United States, Japan, and 
Korea recognize the need to balance the strict nature of the novelty 
requirement with the demands of a healthy patent system, to make 
it accessible to all users by allowing prefiling disclosures.13  The 
European Patent Convention14—and thereby the European Patent 
Office—however, lacks a mechanism to protect unsophisticated 
applicants, who disclose the invention by need or mistake, prior to 
filing a patent application or entering into a nondisclosure 
agreement.15  The disproportionate result is the complete 
destruction of novelty, and a loss of all rights by the inventor.16 
While international harmonization of substantive17 patent law 
has so far been pursued through grand-bargain treaty negotiations, 
this note argues that international harmonization is adequately 
achieved by incremental adoption of best practices by each 
national or regional patent office. 
The United States’ adoption of first-to-file is the leading 
example of a unilateral adoption of international best practices.  
The switch to first-to-file simplified United States patent law for 
both domestic and foreign applicants.  While retaining a grace 
period similar to that in Japan and Korea, the switch at the same 
time necessarily removed features of the first-to-invent system 
 
 11.  GALAMA, supra note 9, at 13. 
 12.  See MOY, supra note 4, § 8:213; Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent 
Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591, 609–10 (1994). 
 13.  See infra Parts III.A–B.  
 14.  The European Patent Convention (EPC) is a multilateral treaty initially 
signed in 1973, under which the European Patent Office operates.  History, EUR. 
PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/history.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2013).  The treaty instituted a patent grant procedure, in which a patent granted 
by the EPO when validated in a member country has the effect of a patent under 
national patent law in that country.  Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents, art. 2(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 [hereinafter European Patent 
Convention] (amended Nov. 29, 2000). 
 15.  See European Patent Convention, supra note 14, art. 55; Straus, supra note 
1, at xi; Roucounas, supra note 4, at 34. 
 16.  MOY, supra note 4, § 8:213. 
 17.  Substantive (patent) law is “the law that creates, defines, and regulates 
the rights, duties, and powers of parties,” as opposed to procedural law.  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1567 (9th ed. 2009). 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss4/12
  
1408 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:4 
benefitting larger companies and other sophisticated applicants.18 
A limited safety-net grace period protecting against an 
inventor’s own otherwise novelty-destroying disclosures is a best 
practice.  Yet, until recently, only the concept of a broad general 
grace period has been negotiated internationally.19  The general 
grace period is incompatible with first-to-file patent systems and 
rightfully failed to be adopted under the European Patent 
Convention.20  The safety-net grace period instead ensures the 
participation of unsophisticated applicants and upholds the 
bargain that all inventors will receive a patent as a reward for their 
disclosure, where the subject matter is not already known. 
This note will first compare and distinguish the features of the 
safety-net grace period to the concept of the general grace period.21  
The note will then review grace periods as they exist in the United 
States, the other four major patent offices, and sixty-seven other 
countries worldwide.22  Next, it evaluates the arguments asserted 
against grace periods23 and analyzes how the absence of a grace 
period impacts European university researchers, small and middle-
sized enterprises, and the general public.24  This analysis shows that 
a safety-net grace period would be beneficial to the users of the 
European patent system and that a suggested model safety-net 
grace period can be implemented through multilateral 
negotiations between the major patent offices.25  Finally, this note 
concludes that the member countries must act without delay to 
amend Article 55 of the European Patent Convention.26 
 
 18.  See 157 CONG. REC. S1089–90 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Patrick Leahy) (“[The interference] process is lengthy, complex, and can cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.  Small inventors rarely, if ever, win interference 
proceedings.”); Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority 
Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1322–23 (2003) (finding that 
interference proceedings, adjudicating which inventor was first to invent, are more 
often initiated by large companies against small companies). 
 19.  See infra Part III.D. 
 20.  See infra Part IV. 
 21.  See infra Part II. 
 22.  See infra Part III. 
 23.  See infra Part IV. 
 24.  See infra Part V. 
 25.  See infra Part VI. 
 26.  See infra Part VII. 
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II. THE GENERAL GRACE PERIOD AND THE SAFETY-NET                       
GRACE PERIOD 
The policy goals of a grace period—allowing unintended or 
necessary prefiling disclosures to perfect the invention and prepare 
it for application—stand in contrast to the policy goals of patent 
law that (1) the public should have certainty in knowing which 
inventions are open to free competition, (2) that patent terms 
should not be extended beyond their statutory limits, and (3) that 
inventors are to be compelled to apply for patent rights promptly.27 
Grace periods, however, vary significantly in the scope of 
protection they afford.  This article separates grace periods into two 
distinct concepts—the general grace period and the safety-net 
grace period—to properly analyze the safety-net grace period as an 
international best practice, notably absent under the European 
Patent Convention. 
A. The General Grace Period 
The concept of a general grace period includes (1) a time 
period during which an inventor’s disclosure does not constitute 
prior art, (2) an enumeration of the types of disclosures permitted 
by the inventor, (3) a protection against disclosures of subject 
matter derived from the inventor, and (4) a right to claim priority 
under the Paris Convention to first-filed national applications 
invoking the grace period.28 
The grace period proposed as Article 12 in the Basic Proposal 
of the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) illustrates a general grace period: 
Disclosures Not Affecting Patentability (Grace Period) 
(1) [Circumstances of Disclosure Not Affecting 
Patentability] Disclosure of information which otherwise 
would affect the patentability of an invention claimed in 
the application shall not affect the patentability of that 
invention where the information was disclosed, during the 
12 months preceding the filing date or, where priority is 
claimed, the priority date of the application, 
 (i)  by the inventor, 
    (ii)  by an Office and the information was contained 
 
 27.  See generally MOY, supra note 4, § 8:207 (quoting TP Labs., Inc. v. Prof’l 
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (discussing the policy 
justifications for the novelty requirement). 
 28.  See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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(a) in another application filed by the inventor 
and should not have been disclosed by the 
Office, or 
(b) in an application filed without the 
knowledge or consent of the inventor by a third 
party which obtained the information direct or 
indirectly from the inventor, or 
(iii) by a third party which obtained the information 
direct or indirectly from the inventor. 
(2) [“Inventor”] For the purposes of paragraph (1), 
“inventor” also means any person who, at the filing date of 
the application, had the right to the patent. 
(3) [No Time Limit for Invoking Grace Period] The 
effects of paragraph (1) may be invoked at any time. 
(4) [Evidence] Where the applicability of paragraph (1) 
is contested, the party invoking the effects of that 
paragraph shall have the burden of proving, or of making 
the conclusion likely, that the conditions of that 
paragraph are fulfilled.29 
When adopted unilaterally, the general grace period, 
including priority rights, presents a significant problem.30  It 
confers benefits not only to applicants disclosing prior to filing an 
application but also to applicants of national offices with a grace 
period filing applications within the twelve months under the Paris 
Convention.  This creates an imbalance between offices with a 
general grace period that allow priority under the Paris Convention 
and offices that do not offer priority under the Paris Convention—
allowing some users up to two years from disclosure to application 
filing.31  The disparate treatment of applicants in the national 
offices  has been a driver in the demand that a general grace 
period can be introduced by international consensus only—and 
contributed to its failure. 
The priority requirement, however, does not contribute 
directly to the above stated policy goals of a grace period—allowing 
unintended or necessary prefiling disclosures to perfect the 
 
 29.  Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing 
the Paris Convention as far as Patents are Concerned, The Hague, Neth., June 3–
28, 1991, The “Basic Proposal” for the Traty and the Regulations, WIPO Doc. 
PLT/DC/3 (1990) [hereinafter Patent Law Treaty Diplomatic Conference of June 
1991] (emphasis added). 
 30.  See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 12. 
 31.  Id. 
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invention and prepare it for application.  Therefore, the general 
grace-period concept can rightfully be criticized for being 
susceptible to use as a strategy to delay the filing of an application 
and creating third-party uncertainty as to what subject matter is 
publicly available.32  That is, it directly contravenes the purpose of 
first-to-file. 
B. The Safety-Net Grace Period 
The safety-net grace period is simple, and more limited, when 
compared with the general grace period.  Safety-net grace periods, 
where they exist, do not grant priority rights under the Paris 
Convention and do not protect against intervening disclosures not 
derived from the original invention, but they do protect a broad 
range of disclosures.  For example, the grace period under the AIA, 
the Korean grace period, and the recently amended Japanese grace 
period all protect all acts disclosing an invention.33 
The purposes of a safety-net grace period are to protect 
unsophisticated applicants against mistakes and to balance the 
needs of the various users of the patent system by allowing 
necessary prefiling disclosures.  The limited scope of subject matter 
protected compels the disclosing inventor to file a patent 
application as soon as possible to avoid intervening disclosures that 
will be deemed prior art.34  The safety-net grace period, then, 
cannot be used as a filing strategy because the risk of an 
intervening disclosure is too great. 
The safety-net grace period therefore encourages prompt 
disclosure, while also reasonably meeting the policy goals of non-
interference with statutory term limits and clear delineation as to 
which knowledge belongs in the public domain.  It is therefore 
consistent with first-to-file because it is easy to administer and does 
not create unreasonable legal uncertainty to third parties.35 
 
 32.  See U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE RESPONSES TO THE 
UK CONSULTATION ON GRACE PERIODS FOR PATENTS 33 (2002); GALAMA, supra note 
9, at 13–14. 
 33.  See infra Parts III.B.2–3. 
 34.  GALAMA, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
 35.  According to the Japan Patent Office (JPO), the examination process is 
not negatively affected by the existence of a safety-net grace period.  TEGERNSEE 
EXPERTS GRP., STUDY MANDATED BY THE TEGERNSEE HEADS: GRACE PERIOD 11 (2012).  
Instead, there is “no significant difference” in how the JPO examines applications 
using the grace period and applications not using the grace period.  Id.  The grace 
period available to applications filed in Japan is discussed infra Part III.B.2. 
8
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III. GRACE PERIODS—THE UNITED STATES, THE MAJOR OFFICES, 
AND THE REST OF THE WORLD 
A. The United States 
1. Brief Background 
United States patent law has evolved from requiring absolute 
novelty to a system in which the policy needs of all users are 
balanced by allowing prefiling disclosures.36  United States patent 
law requires prompt disclosure and limits patent rights to the 
statutory term but allows inventors the opportunity to perfect and 
test the invention.37 
Yet, the United States’ grace period—as it existed until March 
16, 2013—was much more generous than grace periods in first-to-
file countries in that it protected against independent third-party 
disclosures.38  This was a necessary protection under a first-to-invent 
system because the original inventor’s invention date was 
controlling.39  Grace periods under first-to-file laws instead protect 
against only third-party disclosures where they are derived from the 
original invention.40  Given this contrast, grace-period 
harmonization assumed a prominent role as Congress deliberated 
patent reform—including a change to first-to-file.41 
 
 36.  MOY, supra note 4, §§ 8:209–:212 (citing Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 
28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).  The Patent Act of 1836 required absolute 
novelty.  Id. § 2:209.  While the patent acts of 1790 and 1793 did not explicitly 
require an invention to be novel, the Supreme Court held that the Act of 1793 did 
require novelty as of the filing date.  Id. (citing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 7 
(1829)).  The absolute novelty requirement, however, was replaced in the Patent 
Act of 1839 with a two-year grace period, motivated by the need for employers to 
use employees’ inventions prior to an application being filed.  Id. § 8:210.  As the 
distribution of knowledge increased, so did the need to bar inventions based on 
publicly available information that had not yet been put into use or on sale.  Id. 
§ 8:211.  The Patent Act of August 5, 1939, therefore reduced the grace period to 
one year.  Id. § 8:212 (“In particular, the Senate Report accompanying that act 
observed that the grace period allowed the inventor to file a valid patent 
application ‘even when the public may have come to believe that the invention is 
open to anyone.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 76-876, at 1–2 (1939))). 
 37.  See infra Parts III.A.2. 
 38.  See, e.g., GALAMA, supra note 9, at 8 (questioning if grace period is an 
appropriate term in a first-to-file system because “there is not a ‘grace,’ it is the 
first inventor who is entitled to a patent”). 
 39.  See MOY, supra note 4, § 8:35. 
 40.  See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 41.  See Bagley, supra note 1, at 1058.  International negotiations on the topic 
predicated a quid pro quo, trading grace period harmonization in Europe (and 
9
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The House of Representatives, in passing the Patent Reform 
Act of 2007, stipulated that the act was only to take effect “90 days 
after the date on which the President issues an Executive order 
containing the President’s finding that [the Japanese and 
European] authorities have adopted a grace period having 
substantially the same effect as that contained under the 
amendments made by this section . . . .”42  The efforts to exchange 
the United States first-to-invent regime for a grace period were 
ultimately unsuccessful.43  The AIA was passed without a similar 
requirement, and the new grace period contains significant 
limitations that closely align with grace periods in other first-to-file 
countries. 
2. The AIA Grace Period 
The adoption of first-to-file on March 16, 2013, entails changes 
to the grace period due to amendments of 35 U.S.C. § 102.44  First-
to-file was adopted to reduce legal uncertainty resulting in 
interference proceedings and litigation regarding invention dates.45  
Deeming first-to-invent to be “costly and complex,” first-to-file was 
touted to create legal certainty “necessary to raise capital, expand 
businesses and create jobs.”46  As a result, three important aspects 
pertaining to the grace period—the date from which the grace 
period is calculated, the scope of disclosures protected, and the 
 
the rest of the world) for the United States’ adoption of first to file.  See GALAMA, 
supra note 9, at 6; H. Bardehle, Decisive Phase in the Discussion of the Grace Period, 3 
EPI INFORMATION 106, 108 (1999). 
 42.  H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., sec. 3(k)(1)(a) (2007); see also Bagley, supra note 
1, at 1058; Renee E. Metzler, Comment, Not All Grace Periods Are Created Equal: 
Building a Grace Period from the Ground Up, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 371, 372 
n.1 (2009). 
 43.  The Senate companion bill to House Bill 1908 (Senate Bill 1145) failed 
to come before the Senate for full consideration.  Comprehensive Patent Reform 
Legislation: The Road Ahead in the 111th Congress, KING & SPALDING, 1 (Sept. 30, 
2008), http://www.kslaw.com/Library/publication/ca093008.pdf.  Further, 
Senate Bill 1145 did not contain a similar enactment provision to H.R. 1908 sec. 
3(k)(1)(a).  S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 44.  See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, AMERICA INVENTS ACT OF 2011: ANALYSIS AND 
CROSS-REFERENCES § 2 (2011), available at http://www.chisum.com/wp-content 
/uploads/AIAOverview.pdf. 
 45.  See, e.g., Talking Points: Patent Reform, U.S. HOUSE OF REP.                             
JUDICIARY COMM., 1–2, http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform 
%20PDFS/Patent%20Reform%20Talking%20Points.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2013). 
 46.  Id. 
10
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scope of subject matter protected—are amended.  The result is a 
more limited grace period, one that is well within the safety-net 
grace period parameters.47 
a. The Effective Filing Date 
At the center of the AIA is the change to use the effective filing 
date of an application to determine whether disclosures constitute 
prior art.  This change eliminates the aforementioned uncertainty 
resulting from invention date disputes.  Instead, under the AIA an 
inventor first to invent may not receive a patent if an independent 
inventor of the same subject matter was the first to file an 
application. 
Pre-AIA, the grace period was calculated as twelve months 
from the date of disclosure by the inventor or by a third party.48  
Therefore, the grace period not only protected the inventor from 
his own disclosures, but where the inventor could establish an 
invention date prior to the third party’s disclosure, the disclosure 
would not constitute prior art if the inventor filed his application 
within twelve months.49  This principle clearly follows from a first-to-
invent system by protecting the rights of the original inventor.50 
The change to first-to-file under the AIA necessarily eliminates 
protection against independent third-party disclosures of 
nonidentical subject matter made prior to the patent application 
 
 47.  It must be noted that at the time of writing this note, discussions remain 
regarding the final interpretation of § 102(b).  Post-vote colloquy shows an intent 
to retain the pre-AIA grace period.  157 CONG. REC. S1496–97 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 
2011) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
[T]his provision ensures that an inventor who has made a public 
disclosure . . . is fully protected during the grace period.  The inventor is 
protected not only from the inventor’s own disclosure being prior art 
against the inventor’s claimed invention, but also against the disclosures 
of any of the same subject matter in disclosures made by others being prior 
art against the inventor’s claimed invention . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added).  The pre-AIA grace period, however, is not consistent with 
effective use of first-to-file because the ability to preserve priority for broad subject 
matter contravenes the policy of reducing legal uncertainty by abandoning use of 
the invention date. 
 48.  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); CHISUM, supra note 44, § 3.3.4. 
 49.  See Ann McCrackin et al., Comparison of the Current U.S. First-to-Invent 
System with the First-Inventor-to-File System Proposed in the Patent Reform Act of 2011 
(S.23), PATENTLY-O (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/03 
/mccrackinpatentreform.html, for a brief comparison. 
 50.  See CHISUM, supra note 44, § 3.3.2.3. 
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date by an inventor with an earlier disclosure or invention date.51  
Therefore, the subject matter of any third-party disclosure not 
derived from the inventor made prior to the inventor’s effective 
filing date will constitute prior art.52 
b. Scope of Disclosures Protected 
The changes to section 102(a) broaden the definition of prior 
art, but by implication of the amended section 102(b), the 
amended section 102(a) also broadens the scope of disclosures that 
are protected by a one-year grace period.53  The amended novelty 
provision under section 102(a)(1) states, “A person shall be 
entitled to a patent unless—the claimed invention was patented, 
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or 
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention . . . .”54 
For the purpose of the grace period, an important change has 
been made to section 102(a).  A “catch-all” provision has been 
included in the amended section 102(a), making prior art anything 
“otherwise available to the public.”55  According to the final 
Examination Guidelines, the “otherwise available to the public” 
provision’s focus is whether a disclosure was “available to the 
public” and not “the means by which the claimed invention became 
available to the public or on whether a disclosure constitutes a 
‘printed publication’ or falls within another category of prior art as 
defined in AIA 35 [§] U.S.C. 102(a)(1).”56  That is, all acts 
disclosing an invention constitute prior art. 
By implication of the amended section 102(b), the amended 
section 102(a) also broadens the scope of disclosures that are 
protected by a one-year grace period.57  While section 102(a) 
enunciates disclosures considered prior art—including the “catch-
 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), 
§ 102(b), 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)). 
 53.  See Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File 
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,075 
(Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 54.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(a)–(a)(1) (to be 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)) (emphasis added). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File 
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,075. 
 57.  See id. 
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all” provision—section 102(b) only refers to “disclosures.”58  The 
final Examination Guidelines emphasize that “the Office is treating 
the term ‘disclosure’ as a generic expression intended to 
encompass the documents and activities enumerated in AIA 35 
U.S.C. [§] 102(a).”59  Therefore, acts disclosing an invention are 
protected by the grace period, including future means for 
dissemination of information. 
c. Scope of Subject Matter Protected 
The proposed Examination Guidelines contained a significant 
(and controversial)60 limitation on subject matter: 
Even if the only differences between the subject matter in 
the prior art disclosure that is relied upon under 35 
U.S.C. [§] 102(a) and the subject matter publicly 
disclosed by the inventor before such prior art disclosure 
are mere insubstantial changes, or only trivial or obvious 
variations, the exception under 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(1)(B) 
does not apply.61 
Subsequent clarification is provided in the final Examination 
 
 58.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102(b)(1) (to be 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)). 
 59.  Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File 
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,075. 
 60.  It is unclear whether members of Congress understood the narrow scope 
of subject matter that can effectively be protected under first-to-file.  As a result, 
subsequent discussion by practitioners and academia of the intended scope of 
subject matter protection was based primarily on a postvote colloquy between 
Senators Kyl and Hatch.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text; infra notes 61, 
66. 
 61.  Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File 
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 43,759, 43,767 
(proposed July 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (emphasis added).  
Many organizations, international government agencies, research institutions, 
corporations, and individuals voiced their concern with the proposed guidelines.  
See, e.g., Letter from Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Director, Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation, to Commisioner for Patents (Oct. 5, 2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/warf_20121005.pdf.  Specifically, 
commenters are dissatisfied that the grace period under first-to-file will no longer 
protect against intervening independent third-party disclosures of substantially the 
same subject matter, questioning whether the statutory language is rendered 
superfluous by the current U.S. Patent and Trademark Office interpretation.  
Letter from William G. Barber, Am. Intellecutal Prop. Law Assoc. President, to 
David J. Kappos, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. and Dir. of the 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Oct. 5, 2012), Comments to the USPTO on  
First-Inventor-to-File, available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments 
/aipla_20121005.pdf. 
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Guidelines, which moderate the language used but maintain that 
subject matter in a prior art disclosure must be the same—not 
“substantially” the same—subject matter to fall within the grace 
period.62  The amended grace period under section 102(b) thereby 
limits grace-period protection narrowly for subject matter—that is, 
it effectively operates as a safety net for subject matter actually 
disclosed by the inventor or another with a right to the invention 
only.  Any independent intervening third-party disclosure may 
destroy the first disclosure’s novelty if minor variations exist in the 
subject matter disclosed.63  Therefore, U.S. applicants can no 
longer rely on the grace period to exclude a subsequent disclosure 
of similar subject matter, even where a prior invention date can be 
proved.64  This may significantly impact the prior filing practices of 
sophisticated applicants and require stricter control mechanisms in 
large organizations to control disclosures by publication, sale, or 
use.65  As a result, to avoid constituting prior art under the AIA, any 
prefiling disclosure should be evaluated for patentability and an 
application should be filed as soon as possible. 
This is a clear break from first-to-invent, necessary to enforce a 
true first-to-file system.66  It eliminates the discrepancy that exists 
 
 62.  Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File 
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,066.  The 
final Examination Guidelines clarify that the grace period under section 102(b) 
will apply where the same subject matter in an intervening disclosure is not 
verbatim and where the intervening disclosure is a general description of the same 
subject matter previously disclosed.  Id. at 11,077. 
 63.  See id. at 11,067, 11,077; Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America 
Invents Act and Its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 74–81 (2012). 
The statutory provisions were not drafted to permit an inventor to wiggle 
out of prior art and recover patentability for an invention once dedicated 
to the public through publication of the work of an independent, 
unrelated inventor even if that work amounts to an obvious variation of 
what the first-publishing inventor made public. 
Id. at 76–77. 
 64.  Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File 
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,073. 
 65.  See Paul Craane, IP: Does Your Invention Disclosure Form                                      
Send the Right Message?, INSIDE COUNSEL (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www 
.insidecounsel.com/2012/08/14/ip-does-your-invention-disclosure-form-send-the        
-ri?t=ip&page=2 (encouraging early disclosure of inventions to in-house legal 
departments to facilitate prompt filing of patent applications); John Villasenor, 
Commentary: To Protect Your Next Bright Idea, Mind What You Say and When You Say It, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 6, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/To-Protect                
-Your-Next-Bright/129653/ (discussing appropriate measures to be taken by 
universities to comply with the AIA grace period). 
 66.  It is, however, unclear if Congress intended to completely abandon the 
14
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internationally where different people can own patents on the 
same invention due to the ability in the United States to prove an 
earlier invention date.67  It also evidences the sacrifice United 
States’ patent law made as to features beneficial to sophisticated 
applicants in favor of small and unsophisticated applicants—both 
domestic and foreign—who benefit from a simpler system free 
from the high cost of interference proceedings.68 
d. Invoking the Grace Period 
Unlike the grace periods in Korea and Japan,69 there is no 
requirement under the AIA that the applicant must invoke the 
grace period at the time of filing.70  The applicant may do so in the 
specification of the application and must provide documentation to 
overcome a rejection based on the prefiling disclosure or to 
disqualify an intervening third-party disclosure.71 
B. Grace Periods in the Major Offices 
Before proceeding with an analysis of the viability of 
international harmonization of a safety-net grace period, the grace 
periods in force in the other four major patent offices must be 
evaluated.  These offices are the European Patent Office (EPO), 
the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), the Korean Intellectual Property 
Office (KIPO), and the State Intellectual Property Office of the 
People’s Republic of China (SIPO).  Including the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), these five offices account 
for ninety percent of all patent applications filed, and together they 
constitute the IP5—a forum independent of any international 
treaties.72 
 
ability to receive rights as the “first-to-publish.”  Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative 
History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 482–85 (2011). 
 67.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY 124 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004). 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See infra Parts III.B.2–3. 
 70.  Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First-Inventor-to-File 
Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,059, 11,076 
(Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See The Five IP Offices (IP5) and Its Vision, FIVE IP OFFS., http://www 
.fiveipoffices.org/about-us.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
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1. Europe 
Since the enactment of the European Patent Convention in 
1973, European applicants have effectively been without protection 
against disclosures made by applicants unaware of, or unable to 
comply with, the absolute novelty requirement.73 
In place of a grace period, the European Patent Convention 
provides for two types of nonprejudicial disclosures under Article 
55 where disclosure is made within six months of the application 
filing date.74  First, disclosures are protected from “evident abuse” 
by third parties.75  “Evident abuse” requires actual intent to cause 
harm or, alternatively, constructive knowledge that harm could 
ensue from the disclosure.76  A breach of a nondisclosure 
 
 73.  Applicants in Spain continue to have a limited grace period available 
only to applicants when filing a patent application directly in each country.  
Straus, supra note 1, at 37, 40.  In addition, both Germany and the United 
Kingdom had grace periods prior to joining the European Patent Convention.  Id. 
at 15–20.  There is no data indicating that the grace period in Germany caused 
“uncertainty of law” to third parties—the argument asserted against the 
introduction of a grace period under the European Patent Convention.  Id. at 16; 
Heinz Bardehle, Movement in the Dispute About Again Introducing the Novelty Grace 
Period? (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  Further, German 
law provides a grace period for utility model applications.  GER. UTIL. MODEL LAW, 
§ 3(1) (2009) (“Description or use within the six months preceding the date 
relevant for the priority of the application shall not be taken into consideration if 
it is based on the conception of the applicant or his predecessor in title.”). 
 74.  European Patent Convention, supra note 14, art. 55(1).  Article 55 reads 
in full: 
(1) For the application of Article 54, a disclosure of the invention shall 
not be taken into consideration if it occurred no earlier than six months 
preceding the filing of the European patent application and if it was due 
to, or in consequence of: 
(a)  an evident abuse in relation to the applicant or his legal 
predecessor, or 
(b)  the fact that the applicant or his legal predecessor has displayed 
the invention at an official, or officially recognised, international 
exhibition falling within the terms of the Convention on 
international exhibitions signed at Paris on 22 November 1928 and 
last revised on 30 November 1972. 
(2) In the case of paragraph 1(b), paragraph 1 shall apply only if the 
applicant states, when filing the European patent application, that the 
invention has been so displayed and files a supporting certificate within 
the time limit and under the conditions laid down in the Implementing 
Regulations. 
Id. art. 55. 
 75.  Id. art. 55(1)(a). 
 76.   TRILATERAL OFFICES, CATALOGUE OF REMAINING DIFFERENCES 39 (2012), 
available at http://www.trilateral.net/catalogue/catalogue2012.pdf. 
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agreement may not meet this standard.77  Second, an invention 
displayed at an “official, or officially recognized international 
exhibition”78 will be deemed nonprejudicial, if the applicant states 
at the time of filing that the invention was so displayed79 and within 
four months provides a certificate of exhibition.80  However, only 
ten exhibitions have had this designation since 2002.81 
It follows that the protection for disclosures prior to the 
application filing date is extremely narrow both in terms of scope 
of disclosures and scope of subject matter.  There are no 
mechanisms for an inventor to cure an unintended prefiling 
disclosure or for a researcher to present his findings to a journal 
prior to filing an application.  Applicants must strictly adhere to the 
principle of filing first and publishing later—if a patent is desired.82  
This illustrates the “philosophical difference”83 between Europe 
and the United States, Korea, and Japan in pursuing policies that 
accommodate the needs of all users.84 
 
 77.  See Cutting Tools/ACMC, Case No. T436/92, at 18 (Bds. of App. of the 
EPO 1995), available at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/pdf 
/t920436eu1.pdf (holding that the “mere negligence or breach of confidentiality 
does not suffice” to constitute evident abuse under Article 55 of the European 
Patent Convention). 
 78.  European Patent Convention, supra note 14, art. 55(1)(b). 
 79.  Id. art. 55(2). 
 80.  Id.; see European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the European 
Patent Office, pt. A, ch. IV, § 3.1 (2012). 
 81.  Therefore, the protection afforded inventions displayed at official, or 
officially recognized international exhibitions is practically moot.  See EPO 
OFFICIAL J. (2002–2012).  The fourth issue of the journal in each year lists official, 
or officially recognized international exhibitions under “International Treaties.”  
The themes of the recognized exhibitions have primarily been horticultural and 
sustainability.  Id. 
 82.  GALAMA, supra note 9, at 21; GERMAN PATENT & TRADE MARK OFFICE, 
PATENTS: AN INFORMATION BROCHURE ON PATENTS 19 (2010) [hereinafter GERMAN 
PATENT BROCHURE], available at http://www.dpma.de/docs/service 
/veroeffentlichungen/broschueren_en/patents_engl.pdf (“A patent can only be 
granted for innovations that have not yet been communicated to the public, 
neither in writing nor orally.  The right way is to file before publishing.”). 
 83.  See SYLVIE A. STROBEL, THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 2011                                            
AND SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW HARMONIZATION: A EUROPEAN                                      
PERSPECTIVE 5 (2012), available at http://www.brevet.lu/cms/brevet/content.nsf 
/0/17351D95C6E657D3C12579F90048431C/$file/PresentaitonStrobel_26042012                               
.pdf. 
 84.  The EPO has maintained its philosophy of “legal certainty” in rejecting 
attempts to incorporate a grace period to accommodate academic researchers and 
unsophisticated applicants.  See Straus, supra note 1, at 22; see also infra Part IV.A.  
In contrast, the American, Japanese, and Korean grace periods have all expanded 
to adjust to modern knowledge-sharing and invention processes.  See supra Part 
17
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2. Japan 
Japanese patent law includes a six-month grace period.85  
Under the Patent Act’s Article 30, all acts (disclosures) which 
otherwise constitute prior art under Article 29 are protected by the 
grace period.86  The scope of disclosures protected was significantly 
expanded in 2011, and the new Japanese grace period is closely 
aligned with the scope of disclosures protected by the grace periods 
in the United States and Korea.87  The previous Japanese grace 
period was found not to be able to “sufficiently respond to other 
diversifying forms of publications that can be used to announce 
inventions,”88 and therefore its application did “not match the 
purpose of the Patent Act, which is to contribute to the 
development of the industry.”89 
As with the grace period in Korea, the Japanese grace period 
cannot be used as a strategic filing mechanism because intervening 
third-party disclosures or patent applications will constitute prior 
art.90  The grace period is therefore only a safety net, and inventors 
 
III.A.; infra Part III.B. 
 85.  Tokkyohō [Japan Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 30(1) (2012), 
translated in JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR APPLICANTS TO 
SEEK THE APPLICATION OF EXCEPTIONS TO LACK OF NOVELTY OF INVENTION, 
CORRESPONDING TO THE PATENT ACT ARTICLE 30 REVISED IN 2011, at 1                          
(2011) [hereinafter JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES], available at http://www.jpo.go 
.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/pdf/e_pae_paa30/e_tebiki.pdf. 
 86.  See JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 1.  The types of 
disclosures protected under the grace period, however, were significantly 
expanded in 2011 by the amendment to Article 30 of the Japan Patent Act—
effective April 1, 2012.  Id.  Prior to the 2011 amendment to the Japan Patent Act, 
the grace period was available only to certain enumerated types of disclosures: 
disclosures “made public through the implementation of a test, a printed 
publication, an electric telecommunication line, writing presented at an academic 
conference designated by the Commissioner of the Patent Office, or display at a 
specific exhibition, etc.”  Id. 
 87.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), 
§ 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)) 
(protecting any disclosure “otherwise available to the public”); Patent Act, Act No. 
11117, Dec. 2, 2011, art. 1 (S. Kor.). 
 88.  JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 89 (2011) [hereinafter 
JPO ANNUAL REPORT 2011], available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/toushin_e 
/kenkyukai_e/pdf/annual_report2011/part2.pdf. 
 89.  JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 1; see JPO ANNUAL REPORT 
2011, supra note 88, at 89. 
 90.  JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 1 (“[I]f, for example, a 
third party had filed a patent application for the same invention or had published 
such invention prior to the filing date of your patent application, then you can't 
obtain a patent for your invention.”).  See also TEGERNSEE EXPERTS GRP., supra note 
18
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are strongly encouraged to file a patent application as soon as 
possible after disclosing.91  Applicants are also required, at the time 
of filing, to submit a statement of intention to take advantage of the 
grace period and within thirty days file documentation proving that 
the application meets the requirements under Article 30.92 
3. Korea 
Korea’s grace period was expanded from six months to twelve 
months under the Free Trade Agreement between the United 
States of America and the Republic of Korea effective March 15, 
2012.93  This change to Korean law was a product of mutual 
agreement between Korea and the United States as to the purpose 
of patent law.94 
 
35, at 50. 
 91.  JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at 1 (“[I]t is strongly 
recommended that the patent application should be filed as early as possible.”). 
 92.  Japan Patent Act art. 30(3) (2012); JPO OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra 
note 85, at 2–4.  Extensive examples of the documentation to be submitted when 
invoking the grace period can be found in the “Operational Guidelines.”  Id. at 2–
27.  From the declarations invoking the grace period, Japan is able to keep 
detailed statistics on the use of its grace period (although public access to the 
statistics is limited).  Recent statistics show that in 2011, only 0.44% of Japanese 
applications invoked Article 30(2).  TEGERNSEE EXPERTS GRP., supra note 35, at 29.  
In April through June of 2012, 28.7% were filed by large Japanese corporations, 
around 35% by Japanese government and research institutes, and 22.1% by small 
and middle-sized enterprises.  Id. at 31.  These numbers clearly show that a grace 
period benefits universities and small- and middle-sized enterprises, but also large 
corporations, which are otherwise opposed to a grace period in Europe. 
 93.  United States-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor. art. 
18.8(1), June 30, 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements 
/Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html; U.S.-Korea 
Free Trade Agreement: New Opportunities for U.S. Exporters Under the U.S.-Korea Free 
Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade          
-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).  The 
extension of the grace period to twelve months was the only amendment to Article 
30 of the Korean Patent Act—all other provisions remain unchanged.  Hyejung 
Lee & Stephen T. Bang, Patent Law Amendment: Extension of Safe Harbour Grace 
Period for Novelty, INT’L L. OFF. (June 25, 2012), http://www.internationallawoffice         
.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=5e3753ae-2ee2-4473-8a8d-df22d38c538b. 
 94.  The grace period was extended to twelve months to harmonize with the 
United States’ grace period because six months “was not long enough to evaluate 
sufficiently market value, patentability or other factors crucial to deciding whether 
to file a patent application.”  Lee & Bang, supra note 93.  The purpose of the grace 
period under Article 30 of the Korean Patent Act “is to encourage an applicant to 
obtain a patent even after he or she publishes his or her own invention and to 
encourage early publication of an invention to help development of the national 
industry.”  KOR. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, REQUIREMENT FOR PATENTABILITY, ch. 
2, § 5.2 (2012) [hereinafter KIPO REQUIREMENTS], available at http://www.kipo.go 
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Under Article 30 of the Korean Patent Act, any prior art, as 
defined under Article 29(1), does not anticipate the application, 
provided that: (1) the disclosure is made by a person having a right 
to file the patent application, or (2) the disclosure was made 
“against the intention of the person having the right to obtain a 
patent.”95  The disclosures protected by the grace period thereby 
include any “[i]nventions publicly known or worked in . . . Korea or 
in a foreign country prior to the filing of the patent application; 
[or] [i]nventions described in a publication distributed 
in . . . Korea or in a foreign country . . . or inventions made 
accessible to the public through telecommunication lines,” 
including the Internet.96 
Therefore, the scope of disclosures protected under Article 30 
is broad and enables Article 30 to be used as a safety net for 
unintentional disclosures.97  “The purpose of [the grace period] is 
to encourage an applicant to obtain a patent even after he or she 
publishes his or her own invention and to encourage early 
publication of an invention to help development of the national 
industry.”98 
Similar to the provisions of the Japanese grace period, the 
Korean Examination Guidelines state that Article 30 cannot be 
taken advantage of where an identical disclosure is made between 
the original disclosure and the application filing date.99 
 
.kr/upload/en/download/RequirementsforPatentability.pdf. 
 95.  Patent Act, Act No. 11,117, Dec. 2, 2011, art. 30(1) (S. Kor.). 
 96.  Id. art. 29(1).  “A telecommunication line includes public bulletin board, 
e-mail group using a telecommunication line as well as Internet.  Moreover, a new 
electric or electronic telecommunication method which would appear in the 
future as the technology advances, shall also be included.”  KIPO REQUIREMENTS, 
supra note 94, ch. 2, § 3.4.2. 
 97.  “Whether an invention is publicly known by a person with the right to 
apply for a patent or by a person against the intention of a person with the right to 
apply for a patent, the type of disclosure is not restricted.”  KIPO REQUIREMENTS, 
supra note 94, ch. 2, § 5.3.3(3). 
 98.  Id. ch. 2, § 5.2. 
 99.  Id. ch. 2, § 5.5.3(2). 
When there are [sic] an invention (A) which is filed for claiming that it is 
not considered to be publicly known and another invention (B) which is 
the same as invention [(A)] but laid open by a third person between the 
date of disclosing the invention (A) under Article 30 paragraph (1) 
subparagraph (1) and the filing date of the invention (A), an examiner 
shall refuse the application of invention (A) for the reason of lacking 
novelty, except the obvious fact: the laying open of the invention (B) was 
made by learning from the disclosure (A). 
Id. 
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To take advantage of Article 30, an applicant having self-
disclosed must, at the time of filing the application, state that the 
application intends to claim advantage under Article 30 and submit 
a document proving the “relevant facts” within thirty days of filing 
the application.100 
4. China 
Compared to Japan and Korea, the grace period in Chinese 
patent law is much more narrow.  The grace period, however, does 
offer additional protection that is not available to applicants before 
the EPO. 
Namely, while Article 24 of the Patent Law of People’s 
Republic of China extends grace-period protection to disclosures at 
recognized international exhibitions and involuntary third-party 
disclosures, it also protects first-time publications at “a specified 
academic or technological conference.”101  Even if this provision is 
far from the scope of disclosures permitted in the United States, 
Japan, and Korea, it still more appropriately recognizes the need 
for public disclosure of certain knowledge prior to the filing of a 
patent application, as compared to the nonprejudicial disclosure 
protection under Article 55 of the European Patent Convention.102 
The Chinese government has shown strong willingness to 
harmonize its patent law to international standards through 
 
 100.  Patent Act, art. 30(2) (S. Kor.).  Where a disclosure is made by a third 
party without title to the invention, the applicant with the legal right to file the 
application is not required to declare the intention to claim advantage under 
Article 30(1).  KIPO REQUIREMENTS, supra note 94, ch. 2, § 5.4.2. 
 101.  Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008) (China).  Article 24 reads in full: 
Within six months before the date of application, an invention for which 
an application is filed for a patent does not lose its novelty under any of 
the following circumstances: 
(1) It is exhibited for the first time at an international exhibition 
sponsored or recognized by the Chinese Government; 
(2) It is published for the first time at a specified academic or 
technological conference; and 
(3) Its contents are divulged by others without the consent of the 
applicant. 
Id. art. 24. 
 102.  Critics may find that the protection granted to disclosures made at 
officially recognized academic or technological conferences is subject to 
determinations that may be made based on political considerations.  See Metzler, 
supra note 42, at 390–91. 
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negotiations with the United States Trade Representative and the 
USPTO at various international forums, including the IP5.103  
Therefore, while China has a very limited safety-net grace period at 
present, one can reasonably expect the grace period to be aligned 
with United States, Japanese, and Korean law in the future.104 
C. Other Countries with a Grace Period 
Grace periods are not limited to the major offices.  In addition 
to the United States, Japan, Korea, and China, sixty-eight countries’ 
national laws offer grace period protection more generous than 
Article 55 of the European Patent Convention.105  The protection 
offered varies in scope from publication of disclosures made to 
scientific societies, to protection from all acts constituting a 
disclosure by the inventor, including the right to claim priority 
under the Paris Convention (i.e., a general grace period).  In fact, 
forty-six countries’ national laws provide for a general grace period 
with Paris Convention priority.106 
Although Article 12 of the “Basic Proposal”107 was not included 
in the PLT as adopted, many countries incorporated a similar 
article into national law.108  As a result, out of the top fifteen patent 
offices in the world, when measured by total applications filed,109 
 
 103.  See The Summary of the 11th Trilateral Policy Dialogue Meeting Among JPO, 
KIPO and SIPO, JAPAN PAT. OFF. (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.jpo.go.jp/torikumi_e 
/kokusai_e/11th_meeting.htm; U.S. and China Conclude 22nd Session of the Joint 
Commission on Commerce and Trade, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, (Nov. 21, 
2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/november 
/us-and-china-conclude-22nd-session-joint-commissi. 
 104.  Considering Chinese patent law was only enacted in 1984, it has been 
through a remarkable development, in which the Chinese government has proven 
that it will continue to improve its patent system and enforcement of patent rights.  
See generally Rachel T. Wu, Comment, Awakening the Sleeping Dragon: The Evolving 
Chinese Patent Law and Its Implications for Pharmaceutical Patents, 34 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 549 (2011). 
 105.  The seventy-two countries are those countries with national laws allowing 
a broader scope of disclosures than Article 55 of the European Patent Convention 
(i.e., permits prefiling disclosures by the inventor not strictly confined to official, 
or officially recognized international exhibitions).  See Frederik Struve, Novelty 
Grace Periods: A National Law Survey, MITCHELL OPEN ACCESS 1 (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://open.wmitchell.edu/stusch/3. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See supra Part II.A. 
 108.  Straus, supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 109.  WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 2012 WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES 17 
(2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en 
/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_2012.pdf. 
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only the European offices—the EPO, Germany, France, and Great 
Britain—do not afford any grace period protection for at least 
some type of prefiling disclosure.110  Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
India, Mexico, and Russia are all first-to-file systems operating with 
a variation of a grace period.111  It can therefore be intimated that 
although some countries offer a general grace period, the safety-
net grace period at a minimum is already an international best 
practice, which remains to be adopted by the EPO and the 
European Patent Convention member countries. 
D. A Brief Overview of the Failure to Reach Agreement on a Harmonized 
General Grace Period 
Since nearly half of the members of the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty have a grace period with broader rights than Article 55 of 
the European Patent Convention,112 the question must be asked: 
Why has Article 55 persisted in its current form? 
The discussion on the introduction of an internationally 
harmonized grace period has been ongoing for the past thirty years 
as part of negotiations on broad substantive patent-law 
harmonization.113  But the grace period negotiations have primarily 
focused on adoption by treaty of a general grace period.114  The 
incongruence between the United States as a first-to-invent system 
and the first-to-file systems in all other countries became a long-
held excuse for heels to be dug in on both sides of the argument.115 
The requirement of a quid pro quo—exchanging first-to-
invent for European adoption of a general grace period—allowed 
the negotiations and discussions between patent offices and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to remain abstract and 
unnecessarily focused on an unlikely grand bargain in which all 
national and regional patent offices would adhere to the exact 
 
 110.  See generally Straus, supra note 1 (evaluating the arguments for and 
against the introduction of a grace period in European patent law). 
 111.  Struve, supra note 105. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Efforts to include a grace period in European patent law have been 
underway since 1982.  See Straus, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 114.  Various forums have been employed in attempts to reach international 
agreement—most recently the Substantive Patent Law Treaty.  See id. at 7–15; 
Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without 
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 
85, 89–90 (2007). 
 115.  See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
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same general grace period.116 
Therefore, the quid-pro-quo approach117—advocated both by 
United States law makers and users of the European Patent Office, 
each fearful of forfeiting the strengths of their respective patent 
systems118—faced an insurmountable task of reaching international 
agreement on detailed issues.119 
In the end, negotiations on substantive patent-law 
harmonization failed primarily due to considerations not related to 
the adoption of a general grace period.120  This failed process, 
however, should not discourage the major offices from pursuing a 
best practice safety-net grace period that appropriately limits its 
scope to preclude its use as a filing strategy. 
IV. REFUTING THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST                      
GRACE PERIODS 
A. Legal Uncertainty 
The primary argument against a general grace period is fairly 
straightforward, citing “legal uncertainty” to third parties, 
individual inventors, and small- and middle-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).121  Legal uncertainty is—unfortunately—an uncertain 
concept.122  The argument (presupposing priority rights will be 
 
 116.  An international grace period thus required agreement as to several 
aspects, including (1) length of the grace period, (2) type of disclosures protected, 
(3) the people permitted to make protected disclosures, (4) ability to claim 
priority in subsequent international applications, (5) if the grace period could be 
invoked after filing the application, and (6) the evidentiary standard when 
invoking the grace period—by the inventor or by a third party.  See Patent Law 
Treaty Diplomatic Conference of June 1991, supra note 29, at 21–22; GALAMA, 
supra note 9, at 5–10; Straus, supra note 1, at 13. 
 117.  See supra note 41. 
 118.  GALAMA, supra note 9, at 6–7. 
 119.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 120.  Straus, supra note 1, at 13. 
 121.  SMEs are companies that employ fewer than 250 persons and have an 
annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet 
total not exceeding EUR 43 million.  Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs): 
What is an SME?, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme 
/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2013). 
 122.  See Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1737, 1768 n.100 (2011); Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal 
Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (2010).  Often, at the 
request of the EPO, the expert opinion of Jan Galama is cited as spelling out the 
arguments against a grace period.  See Bagley, supra note 1, at 1056–57; 
Roucounas, supra note 4, at 35; The Controversial “Grace Period,” EUR.                         
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included), however, is decidedly circular in its professed desire to 
protect university researchers, individual inventors, and SMEs.123 
The thrust of the argument is that a grace period, whether six 
or twelve months, will add a time period—in addition to the 
eighteen months from application until publication—in which 
third parties cannot know whether an invention is protected by 
patentable rights.  It is claimed that because a grace period allows 
disclosed inventions to be publicly known, an undue burden is 
placed on third parties to either wait or ascertain whether the 
invention will later be claimed in a published patent application.124  
Prior-art searches therefore would not be as efficient compared to 
those carried out under systems with absolute novelty, and 
freedom-to-operate analysis would face similar obstacles.125  The 
argument further reasons that these impediments will drive up the 
cost of investment decisions and result in delays in 
commercialization of inventions.126 
The international patent system, however, is inherently 
uncertain.127  The argument against the introduction of a grace 
period therefore promotes the illusion that without a grace period, 
certainty is preserved.  There is no documentation that patent 
systems with a grace period have created legal uncertainty to third 
parties resulting in impeded decisions on commercialization of 
inventions or driven up the cost of investment decisions.128  Third 
 
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/research/infocentre/article_en.cfm?item=Result 
%20of%20search&id=/comm/research/infocentre/export/02-07-soc03_105.html 
&artid=105 (last updated Jan. 7, 2002). 
 123.  Mr. Galama argues that a grace period would not be beneficial to 
university researchers and SMEs because their inventions might be appropriated 
by third parties through early disclosure or that the early disclosure would cause 
loss of rights under the Paris Convention.  GALAMA, supra note 9, at 11–14.  It is 
questionable, however, if Mr. Galama truly believes university researchers have any 
role to play in the patent system: “[I]n a business environment it is widely accepted 
that the personal freedom of scientist [sic] has to have its constraints.”  Id. at 20.  
Mr. Galama further states that “if scientists, universities etc. wished to become 
players in the economic world, they would have to disregard some old habits.”  Id. 
at 23. 
 124.  Id. at 13. 
 125.  See id. 
 126.  See id.; Roucounas, supra note 4, at 34–35. 
 127.  See Stuart MacDonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of 
Patent Strategy on Innovation, 16 INFO. ECON. POL’Y 135, 138–39 (2004). 
 128.  See Bardehle, supra note 73, at 2–3.  Considering that seventy-two 
countries have a grace period with broader protection than Article 55 of the 
European Patent Convention—and no reports exist documenting adverse 
effects—the argument of legal uncertainty appears untenable. 
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parties, and large companies especially, already operate in a reality 
in which the scope of an invention’s patentable rights are initially 
determined at the grant of a patent but ultimately can only be 
considered certain following opposition proceedings or 
litigation.129  The eighteen-month publication date, then, does not 
serve as a benchmark for third parties to start engaging in use of 
disclosed inventions with full certainty of non-infringement. 
Further, the mechanics of the safety-net grace period, 
including the grace periods employed in the United States, Japan, 
and Korea, rarely will allow an inventor to take advantage of the full 
temporal scope of a grace period—whether six or twelve months—
due to the risk of intervening prefiling publications constituting 
prior art.130 
B. Detrimental Reliance 
The second argument is that absolute novelty is preferable 
since it protects inventors from their own mistakes.131  That is, if a 
grace period were in place, inventors could rely on it to their 
detriment because intervening disclosures might constitute prior 
art.132  Therefore, inventors risk deteriorating the exploitability of 
their inventions by disclosing under a grace period.133 
In general, when a powerful industry purports to speak on 
behalf of smaller actors, it should be cause for concern.134  So, too, 
is the case when the patent counsel of one of the largest filers in 
the EPO135 claims to advocate in the best interest of university 
researchers, individual inventors, and SMEs.136  Even so, it is 
 
 129.  Straus, supra note 1, at 91; Mullally, supra note 122, at 1113. 
 130.  The scenario of an invention remaining unpublished for up to thirty 
months therefore seems unfounded because inventions under a safety-net grace 
period must be filed as soon as possible after the initial disclosure to avoid the 
potential loss of rights.  As described in Part IV.B., this further eliminates Mr. 
Galama’s concern that unsophisticated users of the patent system will 
detrimentally rely on a grace period. 
 131.  See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 12–13. 
 132.  Id. at 11–12. 
 133.  Id. at 18, 21. 
 134.  See MacDonald, supra note 127, at 136. 
 135.  Mr. Galama is listed on the expert opinion at Philips International B.V.  
GALAMA, supra note 9, at 1.  In 2011, Philips filed the second most applications in 
the European Patent Office.  EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2011—
TOP APPLICANTS 1 (2012), available at http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon 
/eponet.nsf/0/8AA0C5EA5DB73EAEC12579C2002B829B/$File/top_applicants 
_en.pdf. 
 136.  GALAMA, supra note 9, at 11–14.  The insincerity of this alleged concern is 
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advocated that granting inventors additional rights under a grace 
period may result in those same rights not always being available if 
intervening disclosures are made. 
This argument fails because it disregards that the inventor, at 
the very least, had an opportunity to remedy the prefiling 
disclosure—an opportunity not available under absolute novelty.  
Further, a safety-net grace period does not encourage reliance 
because its purpose is to provide no more than a limited 
opportunity for an applicant to remedy the prefiling disclosure. 
C. Nondisclosure Agreements and Provisional Applications 
It follows naturally that those in favor of strict adherence to 
absolute novelty also advocate that the best way to avoid novelty-
destroying disclosures is to file a patent application first.137  While 
nondisclosure agreements and provisional patent applications are 
advocated as alternative means of protection prior to the filing of a 
patent application, they do not provide adequate protection. 
A nondisclosure agreement is a contract, the breach of which 
is actionable.  But, a disclosure resulting from breach of 
confidentiality may become prior art under the European Patent 
Convention if the party in breach did not deliberately intend to 
cause harm.138  This may cause a disclosure to be deemed prior art, 
even where someone skilled in the art could not access the 
disclosed information.139  Unsophisticated applicants may not know 
that a nondisclosure agreement is required before revealing the 
invention to potential collaborators, buyers, or investors.  While 
nondisclosure agreements will remain extremely important under a 
safety-net grace period, the grace period will provide inventors an 
opportunity to avoid complete novelty destruction of their 
inventions. 
 
not well disguised.  “[P]ersonal freedom of scientist[s] has to have its 
constraints[,]” and “[t]he question whether or not a grace period should be 
introduced has to be answered by the business, i.e. the management responsible 
for investments etc.”  Id. at 20. 
 137.  Id. at 18–19, 21. 
 138.  Cutting Tools/ACMC, supra note 77, at 18.  A disclosure made in breach 
of a confidentiality agreement constituted prior art because it was not made with 
the “[d]eliberate intention to harm the other party,” or with “probabl[e] . . . 
knowledge of the possibility of harm resulting from a planned breach” of the 
confidentiality agreement, and therefore did not meet the “evident abuse” 
standard under Article 55 of the European Patent Convention.  Id. 
 139.  ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 5. 
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Provisional patent applications are not available to EPO 
applicants.  Provisional applications may provide an initial filing 
date, but the application must be able to fully enable later non-
provisional applications to preserve the earlier filing date.140  
Inventions may not be developed adequately to disclose the subject 
matter, so as to fully support the claims included in the non-
provisional application.141  Therefore, for provisional applications 
to be as effective as a safety-net grace period, the European Patent 
Convention would have to be amended both to include provisional 
applications and to allow for much broader claim interpretation—a 
far more complex change in national law and the European Patent 
Convention than the introduction of a grace period.142 
V. THE SAFETY-NET GRACE PERIOD’S POSITIVE IMPACT 
The major opponents to the introduction of a grace period 
under the European Patent Convention have traditionally been 
large companies.143  These companies—at least in theory—derive 
several advantages from a patent system without a grace period in 
Europe.  First, they benefit from a patent system that discourages 
European academia from fully pursuing the commercial potential 
of its inventions, often foregoing commercialization if publication 
has occurred.144  Second, large companies benefit where an 
inventor takes advantage of a grace period in one jurisdiction but is 
unable to seek protection in the EPO, leaving the subject matter 
open to free exploitation.145 
It is also likely, however, that large companies themselves will 
benefit from a safety-net grace period.  Following the 2011 
amendment to Japanese law, statistics show that large corporations 
increased their share of applications invoking the grace period.146  
 
 140.  Where the disclosed invention in a provisional application cannot 
adequately enable the described invention in a nonprovisional application, the 
earlier filing date of the provisional application may be lost.  Straus, supra note 1, 
at 70.  The utility requirement in Canadian patent law strictly enforces the 
enablement of the earliest disclosure, effectively rendering certain pharmaceutical 
technologies unpatentable.  See Jay Erstling et al., Usefulness Varies by Country: The 
Utility Requirement of Patent Law in the United States, Europe, and Canada, 3 CYBARIS 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 13–19 (2012). 
 141.  Straus, supra note 1, at 69−70. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See Bardehle, supra note 73, at 1. 
 144.  See Roucounas, supra note 4, at 32. 
 145.  See Bardehle, supra note 73, at 1–2. 
 146.  TEGERNSEE EXPERTS GRP., supra note 35, at 31. 
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In Europe, the “evident abuse” standard of Article 55 equally 
subjects large companies and SMEs to novelty destruction where 
confidentiality agreements are breached by negligence or without 
intent to harm.147  And, while the legal certainty argument is 
prevalent, movement can be registered among industry associations 
representing various large corporations in Europe.  At least 
“unintentional disclosures” by an inventor have been conceded as 
acceptable,148 and BusinessEurope (formerly UNICE) has voiced 
itself in favor of a safety-net grace period where it cannot be used as 
a “systemic practice.”149  As with the switch to first-to-file in the 
United States that primarily benefitted small and unsophisticated 
applicants by simplifying the patent system,150 the concerns of large 
European companies need to reasonably yield to the benefits 
conferred to SMEs and university researchers by the introduction 
of a safety-net grace period. 
A. Publishing Academia 
Balancing the needs of large companies with those of 
university research will realize several benefits.  European university 
researchers will be able to publish when absolutely necessary 
without relinquishing their patent rights.  University researchers 
must “publish or perish.”151  Publishing is vital to the professional 
reputation of a researcher, and publishing first may be crucially 
important.152  With a safety-net grace period, researchers will have 
 
 147.  See supra notes 75, 135 and accompanying text. 
 148.  GALAMA, supra note 9, at 26. 
 149.  Mike Barlow, UNICE, Address at Roundtable of NGOs: Patent                       
Law Harmonization: Is There a Way Forward? (Nov. 11, 2003),                                
available at http://www2.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings_and 
_Events1/International_Symposia1/UNICIE2.pdf.  It can be inferred that the 
systemic practice referred to is the ability to use the grace period as a strategic 
patenting tool in claiming priority without risking loss of rights to intervening 
disclosures.  See also Walter Holzer, European Patent Institute (EPI), Address at 
Roundtable of NGOs: Patent Law Harmonization: Is There a Way Forward? (Nov. 
10, 2003), available at http://www2.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings 
_and_Events1/International_Symposia1/epi1.pdf (voicing support for a grace 
period that cannot be taken “actively advantage of”). 
 150.  See supra Part III.A. 
 151.  See, e.g., The Controversial “Grace Period,” supra note 122. 
 152.  Chiara Franzoni & Giuseppe Scellato, The Grace Period in International 
Patent Law and Its Effect on the Timing of Disclosure, 39 RES. POL’Y 200, 203 (2010).  
Enabling researchers to present their findings without the pressure to pursue 
patenting immediately will “smooth[] the trade off between a quick disclosure to 
the scientific community and the timings of a patent procedure.”  Id. 
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the opportunity to commercialize the research as well. 
In one German study, 32.4 percent of university researchers 
responded that because of the lack of a grace period they were 
unable to pursue patent rights where they initially had planned to 
do so.153  Additionally, 54 percent found that the lack of a grace 
period was a problem in their work.154  To avoid loss of patent 
rights, the advice to the academic community thus far has been to 
file first and publish later.155  The experiences in other countries 
with grace periods, however, clearly prove that academic 
publications and patent rights are not mutually exclusive.156 
Even more so, inventions resulting from university research 
that utilize the grace period in the United States were found to be 
published ten months prior to the application filing date in the 
United States, whereas academic publications in Europe are not 
made available to the public until sixteen months after the 
application filing date.157  Clearly, with a grace period the goal of 
sharing inventions with the general public is then better 
achieved.158 
B. Small- and Medium-Sized Entities 
European SMEs are also limited in their ability to succeed 
under Article 55 of the European Patent Convention.  SMEs are 
often financially constrained and unsophisticated in patent law.159  
Therefore, SMEs often need time to evaluate, develop, and seek 
funding for inventions before deciding whether to seek patent 
rights.160 
Compared to large companies, SMEs by nature have fewer 
resources available—whether human or financial—to develop 
inventions and to patent them.161  The result is that SMEs file 
 
 153.  BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR BILDUNG UND FORSCHUNG, ZUR EINFÜHRUNG DER 
NEUHEITSSCHONFRIST IM PATENTRECHT – EIN USA-DEUTSCHLAND-VERGLEICH BEZOGEN 
AUF DEN HOCHSCHULBEREICH 64 (2002) (Ger.) [hereinafter BUNDESMINISTERIUM]. 
 154.  Id. at 115. 
 155.  See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 21; GERMAN PATENT BROCHURE, supra note 82, 
at 19. 
 156.  See Franzoni & Scellato, supra note 152, at 206. 
 157.  Id.  
 158.  Straus, supra note 1, at 73. 
 159.  See MOY, supra note 4, § 8:605 n.7; Paul-Alexander Wacker, Milestones for 
Improving the Protection of SME Innovations, IP VALUE 2012, Jan. 20, 2012, at 39.  
 160.  See Gaétan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit Their Intellectual Property 
Assets: Evidence from Survey Data, 39 SMALL BUS. ECON. 437, 447 (2012).  
 161.  Id. at 449. 
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patent applications on a smaller ratio of their inventions than large 
companies.162  In turn, European SMEs also utilize a higher ratio of 
the patents that they are granted when compared to large 
companies.163  This highly selective process used by SMEs to 
determine which inventions to patent often depends on whether 
the SME can acquire the necessary capital to commercialize the 
invention and to acquire patent rights.164  Traditional bank lending 
is not available for this purpose because European banks are 
unwilling to accept intangible assets as collateral.165  Risk-willing 
capital must therefore be sought from venture-capital companies.166 
An unsophisticated European SME is then at risk if it does not 
recognize that it must enter into a nondisclosure agreement with 
the capital partner prior to disclosing the invention—whether 
publicly or confidentially.  Disclosing the invention to investors not 
only helps the SMEs raise capital for commercially viable 
inventions, it also saves the SMEs capital by not filing patent 
applications for those inventions with limited or no commercial 
potential.167  In Japan, SMEs filed nearly four times as many 
applications under the grace period following its expansion in 
2011, and applications filed by joint applicants not including a 
university more than doubled168—clearly showing the benefits 
private business can derive from a safety-net grace period. 
Therefore, the absolute-novelty requirement of European 
patent law disproportionately punishes SMEs who are 
 
 162.  Marcus Holgersson, Patent Management in Entrepreneurial SMEs: A 
Literature Review and an Empirical Study of Innovation Appropriation, Patent Propensity, 
and Motives, R&D MGMT. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at http:// 
www.ip-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/PAM11-20120814a-with-publ          
-info.pdf. 
 163.  Rassenfosse, supra note 160, at 444.  European SMEs utilize a higher ratio 
of their patents—either through the SMEs’ own use or through licensing—
because the high cost of obtaining a patent forces SMEs to be selective in the 
patents applied for.  Id.  The lower utilization ratio by larger companies is also 
influenced by defensive patenting strategies in building patent portfolios with 
“sleeping” patents.  Id.  
 164.  See id. at 447. 
 165.  Id. at 441 (“[A] survey of about 50 European commercial banks found 
none that routinely accept intangible assets as collateral for loans to new 
technology-based firms.” (citing EUROPEAN COMM’N, FUNDING OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
BASED FIRMS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS IN EUROPE (2000))). 
 166.  Holgersson, supra note 162, (manuscript at 10).  The majority of the 
SMEs surveyed by Holgersson stated that “patenting is crucial to attract venture 
capital.”  Id.  
 167.  See Franzoni & Scellato, supra note 152, at 203. 
 168.  TEGERNSEE EXPERTS GRP., supra note 35, at 31. 
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unsophisticated in patent law, commercial transactions, or both.  
Absolute novelty strips away any opportunity for SMEs to redeem 
themselves from an ill-advised disclosure made in the process of 
perfecting the invention or raising capital for its 
commercialization.  The anachronistic limitations of Article 55 of 
the European Patent Convention therefore have the potential to 
result in a knowledge loss to the SMEs and a financial loss to both 
the SMEs and the European economy as a whole.  It is no solution 
to instruct SMEs to “file first and publish later.”169 
Ninety-nine percent of European companies are SMEs.170  
Patent law must be structured to at least take into account the 
needs of the predominant business model.  Further, European 
SMEs suffer from conditions restricting their ability to grow that 
are not present in the United States.171  Labor laws often make it 
difficult for SMEs to hire new employees because they may not be 
terminated easily.172  In addition, bankruptcy laws often do not 
discharge the borrower for several years—if ever—causing SMEs to 
be less risk tolerant.173 
Given these barriers to economic growth, unnecessary patent-
law limitations should not hold back economic activity by European 
SMEs any further.  At a minimum, a safety-net grace period would 
afford SMEs the opportunity to raise capital without risking the 
intangible asset attracting the investment, potentially resulting in 
economic growth from a commercialized invention. 
 
 169.  See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 21; GERMAN PATENT BROCHURE, supra note 
82, at 19. 
 170.  Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs): Facts and Figures About the EU’s 
Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu 
/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 
2013). 
 171.  See, e.g., European Entrepreneurs: Les Misérables, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2012, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/21559618. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  PAUL WYMENGA ET AL., ARE EU SMES RECOVERING?  ANNUAL REPORT ON EU 
SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES 2010/2011 35–36 (2011), available at http:// 
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-review 
/files/supporting-documents/2010-2011/annual-report_en.pdf. 
Most entrepreneurs are not willing to start-up their own company if they 
know in advance that they would not be given a second chance.  If given 
the chance, failed entrepreneurs do learn from their mistakes and are 
generally more successful the second time round creating more jobs and 
a higher turnover than first[-time entrepreneurs]. 
Id. at 36 (footnotes omitted); see also European Entrepreneurs: Les Misérables, supra 
note 171. 
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C. General Public 
Patents are often compared to strong monopolies.174  They are 
too powerful to be granted to subject matter or inventions already 
publicly known.175  The monopoly is granted in return for public 
access to the disclosure of the invention—benefitting development 
of future inventions.176  A limited protection for prefiling 
disclosures, only granted to the inventor or his successor in title 
therefore does not controvert the exchange of a monopoly in 
return for public access to the invention.  To the contrary, it grants 
the public access to the invention sooner, facilitating the process of 
new inventions drawing use from the disclosure at an even earlier 
stage.177 
Article 55 of the European Patent Convention, however, limits 
the benefits that can be drawn from university research and SME 
ingenuity.  The public funds university research through taxes.  It 
follows that restricting the ability to commercialize technology 
resulting from the taxpayer-funded research also limits the public’s 
return on investment.178  For example, the application for the 
“Cohen/Boyer Patent” filed under the United States grace period 
generated more than $200 million in revenue for the University of 
California and Stanford University.179 
Further, there is no public policy gain in harshly penalizing 
SMEs in their effort to create new products, new jobs, and 
economic growth.  Novelty destruction is an absurd outcome, 
especially where “a single non-confidential disclosure can represent 
prior art even if persons skilled in the art have no capability of 
reasonably or effectively accessing that disclosure.”180 
The public benefits of a limited grace period have been 
 
 174.  GALAMA, supra note 9, at 13; Straus, supra note 1, at 46–47. 
 175.  See ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 1 (“Inventors are never entitled to take 
from the public subject matter that deemed [sic] already known or merely obvious 
from what is deemed to be known.”). 
 176.  See MOY, supra note 4, § 7:2; Straus, supra note 1, at 73. 
 177.  Straus, supra note 1, at 73; Franzoni & Scellato, supra note 152, at 201 
(finding evidence that U.S. inventions appear in open science journals earlier 
than European inventions even where the applications were not filed under the 
United States grace period). 
 178.  See Joseph Straus, Intellectual Property and Science: A Complex Partnership, in 
ALLEA BIENNIAL Y.B. 2004 19, 25 (Pieter J.D. Drenth & Johannes J.F. Schroots eds., 
2004), available at http://www.allea.org/Content/ALLEA/Themes/IPR/Straus 
_IPR_Complex_Partnership.pdf. 
 179.  Straus, supra note 1, at 69. 
 180.  ARMITAGE, supra note 9, at 5. 
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noticed.  The German Patent Office, a German government 
advisory council, and German parliament members have all 
endorsed the notion of a grace period to permit prefiling 
disclosures by university researchers and inventors seeking to 
commercialize their inventions.181 
VI. BEST-PRACTICE MODEL SAFETY-NET GRACE PERIOD                     
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
Previous efforts at creating a harmonized grace period have 
failed.182  There are too many stakeholders internationally—with 
interests too diverse—to reasonably believe that substantive patent-
law harmonization is attainable among all World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) member countries.  Instead, the 
major offices can and should agree to best practices that can be 
adopted by willing national offices. 
A. Model Grace Period 
As a best practice, the safety-net grace period must take into 
account the interests of all users of the patent system—to the 
degree that it is possible.  As explained above, legal uncertainty and 
alleged possible detrimental reliance on a grace period are not 
valid arguments to exclude the publishing academia, individual 
inventors, and SMEs.183  Because legal uncertainty is a nonfactor, 
the most effective grace period would be twelve months and would 
protect all acts deemed to be a disclosure—similar to the grace 
periods in the United States, Japan, and Korea.184  There should be 
no reason to limit a grace period from evolving with technology 
and society by attempting to predict how disclosures will be made 
in the future. 
The grace period in turn must be limited in the subject matter 
that it protects to promote its use as a safety net only and preserve 
the true nature of a first-to-file system.  This solution appropriately 
balances the concern of larger users in determining what 
constitutes prior art, while protecting academic publications and 
 
 181.  DEUTHSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT] 17/1052, 
at 2; BUNDESMINISTERIUM, supra note 153, at 116; EXPERTENKOMMISSION FORSCHUNG 
UND INNOVATION, RESEARCH, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE IN 
GERMANY: 2009 REPORT, 42–43 (2009). 
 182.  See supra Part III.D. 
 183.  See supra Part IV. 
 184.  See supra Parts III.A, B.2–3. 
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unsophisticated applicants from being harshly and 
disproportionately punished with a total loss of rights.185 
Equally important to protect the rights of unsophisticated 
applicants, a grace period should not require a formal requirement 
to invoke the grace period at the time the application is filed.  This 
corresponds with the safety-net grace period’s purpose to 
accommodate unsophisticated applicants.  Unsophisticated 
applicants may not be aware of the requirement and should not be 
punished for their lack of knowledge.  If a patent office later 
questions the invention’s novelty, the burden should be on the 
applicant to prove his right. 
B. Implementation 
With the enactment of the AIA, the USPTO has been able to 
reengage the major international patent offices in talks regarding 
substantive patent law.186  The United States, however, cannot force 
harmonization of substantive patent law on other patent offices.  
The member countries of the European Patent Convention must 
take it upon themselves to amend Article 55 and adopt a safety-net 
grace period as a best practice.  In switching to first-to-file, the 
United States clearly demonstrated how best practices can be 
adopted to make patent systems easier to use—for both domestic 
and foreign applicants—by reducing legal uncertainty caused by 
the ability of a third party to establish an earlier invention date.  
Amending Article 55 of the European Patent Convention will 
similarly simplify international patent law and substantially benefit 
its member states’ applicants.  The EPO—“stimulated” by not being 
 
 185.  In this regard, the United States unilaterally adopted the safety-net grace 
period as a best practice by switching to first-to-file and limiting the subject-matter 
protection of the grace period under section 102 (b).  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 186.  Oversight over the United States Patent and Trademark Office: Implementation of 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and International Harmonization Efforts: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2012) (statement of David 
Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office) (“Passage of the AIA has 
provided an opportunity to restart long-stalled discussions with our foreign 
counterparts toward substantive harmonization”), available at http://www 
.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-6-20KapposTestimony.pdf; see Benoît Battistelli, The 
Road to Patent Law Harmonisation, EUR. PAT. OFF. (July 12, 2011), http://blog.epo 
.org/patents/the-road-to-patent-law-harmonisation/ (“[T]he impressive legislative 
activity recently seen in the [United States], which should be completed next 
autumn, has given the process a new boost.”). 
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invited to the Asia-Pacific Forum in March 2011187—appears to 
understand the seriousness of the commitment by the other major 
offices to pursue harmonization through best practices.  The EPO 
followed quickly in July 2011 by hosting the heads of the national 
offices of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, 
and Denmark.188  Known as the Tegernsee Group, these offices 
have decided to focus on substantive harmonization of four areas, 
including the grace period.189  The Tegernsee Group is therefore a 
favorable vehicle to agree on the grace period as an international 
best practice.190 
And, while the Tegernsee Group has wisely developed its 
program in detail prior to seeking industry input,191 the 
abandonment of a general grace period should further eliminate 
the concerns of European industry.  It is quite clear that German 
lawmakers prefer a grace period,192 and with the previous Danish 
and French support of a safety-net grace period,193 they must be 
considered to be in favor of the adoption of a grace period under 
the European Patent Convention as well.194 
Amending Article 55 of the European Patent Convention to 
include a safety-net grace period will be of sufficient strategic 
importance to encourage remaining national offices around the 
 
 187.  TOMOKI SAWAI, UPDATE ON HARMONIZATION DISCUSSION                                      
FROM THE JPO’S PERSPECTIVE 5 (2012), available at http://www 
.aipla.org/resources/intlip/Documents/Other-International-Events/US-Bar-JPO             
-Liaison-Council-2012/Update-on-Harmonization-Discussion-from-JPO-Perspective 
.pdf. 
 188.  Battistelli, supra note 186. 
 189.  Heads of Office Discuss Patent Law Harmonisation, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Apr. 25, 
2012), http://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2012/20120425.html.  The four 
areas of substantive patent law harmonization focused on are a grace period, 
eighteen-month publication, prior art effect of secret prior art, and prior user 
rights.  Id. 
 190.  The Tegernsee group will be unencumbered by the diverse agendas of 
the national offices previously participating in WIPO negotiations on substantive 
patent law harmonization. 
 191.  AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, WIPO ASSEMBLIES 2012 REPORT 5 
(2012), available at http://www.aipla.org/resources/intlip/Documents/Other       
-International-Events/WIPO%20Assemblies%20Report%202012.pdf. 
 192.  DEUTHSCHER BUNDESTAG, supra note 181. 
 193.  See GALAMA, supra note 9, at 10; Straus, supra note 1, at 11. 
 194.  The momentum of harmonization in terms of best practices is further 
advanced by the proactive role of the JPO under the auspices of the IP5.  The 
JPO—already having facilitated the tremendously successful Patent-Prosecution 
Highway system—has not let up on its international counterparts to reduce 
inefficiencies caused by the lack of best practices for a grace period.  See SAWAI, 
supra note 187, at 5–7. 
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world to follow this best practice.  The safety-net grace period as a 
best practice, adopted by the United States, Europe, Japan, Korea, 
and hopefully China—in addition to the other sixty-eight countries 
already with some type of grace period—effectively will provide 
unsophisticated applicants the opportunity to internationally 
exploit the commercial value of their inventions when a prefiling 
disclosure occurred. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The European allegiance to absolute novelty has so far been 
unyielding to the legitimate needs of applicants who disclose 
unintentionally or cannot refrain from making a prefiling 
disclosure.  The complete destruction of novelty is a harsh and 
disproportionate result.  It is an outcome that unnecessarily 
penalizes inventors and unsophisticated users and is contrary to the 
basic bargain that inventors will be rewarded with a patent for 
disclosing a novel invention.195  Novelty destruction unduly favors 
large sophisticated applicants who benefit from free access to 
inventions that, with a grace period, would be exploited by the 
“original” inventors—applicants that ultimately may be more likely 
to put the patented invention into actual commercial use in 
Europe.196 
As demonstrated in this note, a limited safety-net grace period 
that protects against otherwise novelty-destroying disclosures is a 
best practice.  It effectively protects the interests of unsophisticated 
inventors and applicants without harming the legal rights of third 
parties.  No quid pro quo is required, but European leaders should 
take notice of the American willingness to create international best 
practices.  Thirty years have already been wasted by the attempts to 
achieve a grand bargain.  Unilaterally adopting a safety-net grace 
period as a best practice to harmonize with the other major offices 
can be achieved without such delay. 
 
 
 195.  See GERMAN PATENT BROCHURE, supra note 82, at 4 (stating that patentable 
rights are the reward to inventors for disclosing information); Bardehle, supra 
note 41, at 107–08. 
 196.  See supra Part V.B. 
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